Researchers are currently refining the concept and theory of trust to focus on identifying the bases of trust within specific domains. This paper examines the development of trust within the domain of agricultural water policy, where trust is a critical resource for solving collective-action problems. The analysis uses data from a mail survey of farmers in agricultural water policy to integrate three theoretical frameworks: the conventional generalized trust perspective, Levi's transaction cost theory of trust, and Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith's Advocacy Coalition
This paper takes a step down the road towards a domain-specific understanding by integrating three theoretical frameworks to explain policy trust, and testing this integrated perspective in the specific domain of agricultural water policy. The three theoretical approaches are Levi's (2000) transaction cost theory, Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith's (1993) Advocacy Coalition Framework, and Rotter's (1971; 1980) generalized trust framework, which has dominated all but the most recent research on trust in political science. These frameworks share a common definition of trust as expectations about whether or not a trustee, in the context of a risky exchange relationship, will behave in a manner beneficial or at least not detrimental to the truster. For political science, the theories also share a mutual interest in trust as shaping the relationship between citizens and political authorities. Where the theories differ is on what they hypothesize as the "bases" of trust, which are the factors that lead a truster to view an actor as more or less trustworthy (Kramer 1999) . The analysis here attempts to identify whether or not there is a dominant basis for policy trust, or whether the theories are mutually reinforcing.
The analysis examines these theories in the domain of agricultural water policy, more specifically collaborative watershed management within the Sacramento Valley Water Quality Coalition (hereafter Coalition; see http://www.svwqc.org/ for more details). Trust is important in this domain because the Coalition directly targets the collective-action problem of non-point source pollution. Non-point source pollution comes from multiple, dispersed agricultural sources, which means that improving water quality requires the combined efforts of most farmers in a watershed. Furthermore, non-point source pollution is hard to monitor and reacts with aquatic ecosystems in complex ways, making it difficult to link farmer behavior and environmental outcomes.
Because individual farmers cannot make a large difference in overall water quality and behavior is costly to monitor, each farmer has an incentive to free ride on the often expensive pollution control efforts of others. Cooperating farmers risk investing in pollution control practices that have little payoff because others are not investing; farmers generally do not want to receive the "sucker's" payoff. Farmers' payoffs also depend heavily on the decisions of a wide variety of non-governmental organizations and government agencies involved with policy implementation. These organizations affect outcomes by supplying information, monitoring behavior, providing positive incentives for cooperation, and sometimes enforcing regulations.
Many researchers agree trust is a critical resource for sustaining cooperation in these situations, where the utility of the truster depends on the strategic choices of trustees (Coleman 1990; Ostrom 1998; Williamson 1996) .
The data comes from a mail survey of 821 farmers who are eligible for the Coalition. A battery of social network questions asks each farmer about the trustworthiness of twenty-one different agencies and organizations (including other farmers) involved with policy implementation, along with the bases of trust identified by each theoretical perspective. Farmerorganization dyads provide the unit of analysis for statistical tests, and the structure of the data should be kept in mind throughout the discussion. To foreshadow, the results of the analysis suggest that the dynamics of trust depend heavily on two factors present in all policy domains: the distribution of political interests and institutional structure of government. Knowing that the dynamics of trust are not monolithic but rather nuanced and contextual is critically important from the broader political science perspective, which views trust as a central feature of democratic governance.
Theoretical Frameworks for Understanding Trust in a Policy Domain
The analysis considers three theoretical frameworks to explain policy trust: the generalized trust approach first established by Rotter (1971; 1980 ), Levi's (2000) transaction cost theory, and Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith's Advocacy Coalition Framework (1993) . The next sections describe the specific hypotheses derived from each framework about the bases of policy trust.
The Generalized Trust Framework
The generalized trust framework hypothesizes that the bases of trust are general predispositions on the part of an individual to trust other people or government. Rahn and Transue (1998) describe generalized trust as a "standing decision" to give most people the benefit of the doubt. These predispositions reflect general views on human nature and society that are inherited or learned in early childhood, and are adjusted over the lifetime of an individual in response to many social experiences. Regardless of the how the updating process works, the generalized trust framework suggests that especially when entering new relationships with an individual or government agency, these predispositions will provide a foundation for the development of behavioral expectations. Kramer (1999) refers to the role of generalized attitudes as the "dispositional" basis of trust.
The generalized trust framework is the foundation of the original trust research done in the context of the National Election Studies and the General Social Survey. These studies use generalized questions about social and government trust such as "Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?", and "How much of the time do you think you can trust the government in Washington to do what is right-just about always, most of the time, or only some of the time?" While this type of "thin" or "moralistic" (Uslaner 2002 ) trust can be useful for diffuse support of government (Hetherington 1998) or establishing expectations about unknown people (Putnam 2001) , the utility of general dispositions may be reduced in the case of "thick" relationships that provide more detailed information about a trustee. This paper examines three generalized trust attitudes: trust in government, external political efficacy, and social trust in other people. Trust in government is relevant because the outcomes of public policy are shaped by the behaviors of the many different government agencies involved with policy implementation. Similarly, external political efficacy-the idea that government is responsive to the demands of citizens-has been directly linked to generalized political trust (Craig 1979; Craig, Niemi, and Silver 1990) . External political efficacy may even be more relevant in the case of public policies such as the Coalition, where members of target groups can directly participate in decision-making for policies that affect their welfare. General social trust is relevant because watershed collective-action problems involve the behavior of other people, including other farmers and personnel from non-governmental and government organizations. Levi's (2000) transaction cost theory of trust derives its name from the idea that trust reduces the need to invest in costly monitoring and enforcement institutions. In situations characterized by distrust, actors invest in costly monitoring and enforcement institutions to insure cooperation and prevent exploitation. In situations characterized by high levels of trust, fewer resources are required for monitoring and enforcement institutions. According to this perspective, institutions and trust are largely substitutes for one another, and thus it is possible to have cooperation without trust.
The Transaction Cost Framework
Most relevant for this analysis, Levi (2000) argues that trust is history-based, where trust thickens or thins as the history of interaction informs the truster about what Bacharach and Gambetta (2000) call the "trust-warranting properties" the trustee: promise keeping, similarity of interests, and competence. Trust is warranted when you believe someone with similar interests is willing and capable of keeping promises. These three beliefs are the knowledge needed for a truster to form expectations about the behavior of a trustee. Hence, the most general hypothesis is that trust is positively related to beliefs about promise keeping, value similarity, and competence.
With its foundation in neoinstitutional economics, the transaction cost framework also emphasizes the role of institutional structures in shaping policy trust. Federalism provides an important institutional structure in the domain of agricultural water policy, because farmers may be less willing to trust institutionally "distant" agencies that infrequently interact with local communities. Institutional distance is partly a function of physical distance, where decisionmakers in state/federal capitals make decisions that affect local jurisdictions. Another component of institutional distance is that centralized institutions tend to make uniform decisions that have to filter through many organizational levels before being locally applied. The greater the institutional distance between a truster and trustee, the higher the transaction costs of developing trust-based relationships. The federalism hypothesis suggests farmers will trust local organizations the most, followed by state/regional, and then national organizations.
The Advocacy Coalition Framework
Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith's (1993) Advocacy Coalition Framework posits that people have belief-systems hierarchically organized into sets of concrete and abstract idea elements.
The lowest level of a belief-system is comprised of secondary beliefs, which are concrete beliefs about elements of a policy domain, including the trustworthiness of specific actors. At a higher and more abstract level are policy-core beliefs, which define fundamental normative preferences regarding the process and goals of policy-making. Policy-core beliefs influence the formation of secondary beliefs because they act as cognitive filters, which affect information processing by causing people to resist (accept) information that is inconsistent (consistent) with their policycore beliefs.
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According to the ACF, trust is a function of the similarity between the policy-core beliefs of the truster and those of the trustee (Leach and Sabatier 2005) . People will trust actors who they believe have very similar beliefs and interests to their own, and their trust will decline as the difference in policy-core beliefs increases. Policy-core beliefs will have the strongest positive effect on trust when the trustee is most similar to the truster, and the strongest negative effect when the trustee is most different. The ACF's conception of trust is similar to what Kramer (1999) calls category-based trust, where trust is "predicated on information regarding a trustee's membership in a social or organizational category", and members of the category have particular policy-core beliefs. Expectations about a trustee from a particular social category are often based on stereotypes, reputation and other information gleaned from media and political discussion, and do not necessarily rely on direct experience. I will investigate two important policy-core beliefs in the agricultural water policy domain: economic conservatism and environmentalism. Economic conservatism focuses on the proper role of government regulation with respect to property rights and private natural resourceuse decisions. People who score high on this scale believe resource decisions should be left to private actors, and generally distrust regulatory agencies. Environmentalism refers to a general adherence to environmental values, and the belief that environmental goals deserve equal or greater priority than economic productivity.
A stylized example from agricultural water policy serves to clarify the ACF hypothesis.
Farmers tend to categorize policy organizations according to their perceived policy interests: regulatory agencies are viewed as serving environmentalists, while local agricultural agencies and private agricultural organizations are seen as serving the farmer. Thus, farmers view regulatory agencies as less trustworthy and local agricultural agencies as more trustworthy. Furthermore, the relationship between economic conservatism and trustworthiness will be strong and positive for agricultural service organizations, and strong and negative for regulatory agencies. The converse will hold for environmentalism. Policy-core beliefs will have much smaller effects on organizations that are viewed as neutral.
Research Design and Analysis
The research is based on a cross-sectional mail survey during Table A1 for response rates and farm size by county).
The vast majority of the non-responses were from unreturned mail surveys.
It is important to remember that the Coalition was initiated in July 2003, and represents California's first attempt to broadly manage agricultural non-point source pollution. Thus, while 18 months had passed between Coalition initiation and the administration of the mail survey, full participation in the Coalition had not been achieved. Many farmers have also resisted the Coalition as an example of government interference with private economic decisions. Hence, the research reported here captures the Coalition groups at an early stage in the evolution of cooperation, where trust is a scarce resource, especially for relationships between farmers and the milieu of agricultural water policy organizations involved in implementation.
Survey information can be compared to the 2002 USDA Agricultural Census (Ag Census) to get a better idea of the representativeness of the sample. In terms of farm characteristics, the respondents are biased towards the larger and slightly richer farms in nearly every county. The mean difference between the respondent farm size and the average farm size in each county is 200 acres. The smallest farm in the entire sample is one acre, and the largest is 15,600 acres. The Ag Census reports 66% of the farms in the 9-county region with annual sales less than $49,000, 10% with $50,000-99,999, and 24% with over $100,000. The study respondents report 55% with less than $49,000 in gross farm revenue, 11% with $50,000-99,999, and 34% with over $100,000. The sample includes some of the largest and richest farms in the region, with 54 (7.5%) reporting gross farm income over $1 million dollars with an average farm size of 2,923 acres.
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In terms of operator characteristics, the sample appears biased towards males; the Ag Census reports 31% of the operators are female in the nine counties, compared to 11% in the sample. However, there is no difference in the race of the operators; the Ag Census reports 86 percent of the operators is white compared to 85 percent in the sample. The respondents have spent an average of 25 years in the farming business, and report working an average of 38 hours per week on farming activities. Twelve percent of the sample has an advanced degree, 43 percent have at least some type of college degree, 22 percent have some college experience, 18 percent have only a high school diploma, and 4 percent did not graduate high school.
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There are two explanations for the observed sample differences. First, there is potentially a mismatch between my sample frame and the sample frame of the Agricultural Census. My sample frame was derived mostly from publicly available lists of registered pesticide users, which are most likely biased towards larger farms. Furthermore, while an individual farm might have a female operator, the male operators may disproportionately apply for the pesticide permits. Second, the Coalition also experiences difficulty reaching out to smaller and less profitable farms in each area; these farms are appear less likely to become involved in agricultural policy initiatives of any type. As will be seen in the data analysis, there is evidence that more financially secure farms are more likely to trust especially local agricultural agencies.
However, the population of farmers that the sample does represent is the most critical for the successful implementation of water policy, because they have the largest per farm impact on water quality, and also tend to be the economic and political leaders of the local agricultural communities. These farmers constitute what Lubell (2005) called the "vanguard of cooperation", where social capital and trust built first among the more involved farmers may spread over time to the rest of the community.
Variable Construction: Measuring Policy Trust
The survey asks farmers to indicate whether they completely trust or completely distrust Agriculture. The trust battery is structured similar to social network questions that ask people to characterize a set of self-reported contacts, or a list of contacts provided by the researcher.
For the purpose of the analysis, I transformed the trust data into farmer-organization dyads. For example, there is one row in the data matrix for each farmer-California Farm Bureau dyad. These dyads are the units of analysis for the statistical models. Because farmers tended to answer these questions only for agencies they indicated some level of contact with, and some farmers completely skipped the trust questions, not all farmer-organization dyads are available for analysis for every farmer. Later, I will discuss how I use Heckman selection bias models to statistically correct for the non-random selection of observed dyads.
Variable Construction: Independent Variables
The independent variables for the generalized trust framework are measured with three disagree-agree (7-point scales; 0= disagree, 7= agree) questions adapted from the National The trust-warranting properties identified by the transaction cost framework are measured in the same organizational network batteries described in the previous section. For each of the twenty-one organizations, the farmers indicate whether or not they believe the organization keeps promises (11-point scale; 0= never keeps promises, 10= always keeps promises), is competent (11-point scale; 0= completely incompetent, 10 = completely competent) and has the same policy interests as the farmer (11-point scale; 0= Very similar policy interests, 10 = very different policy interests). As discussed above, the transaction cost framework assumes these trust-warranting properties are the basis for the overall trust evaluation, and thus overall trust serves as a dependent variable. I will later discuss the viability of this assumption for crosssectional data. 
Descriptive Analysis: The Landscape of Trust
For a basic idea of the landscape of trust in the Sacramento River watershed, Figure 1 presents the mean levels of trust, promise keeping, competence, and value similarity judgments for each of the 21 organizations listed in the trust battery. These are the central concepts identified by the transaction costs framework. The horizontal axis is organized from left to right in terms of in decreasing frequency of non-contact with that particular organization. For example, 95% of farmers report never contacting the US Environmental Protection Agency about water quality policy, 68% report never contacting a commodity organization, and 46% report never contacting the County Agricultural Commissioner.
[ Figure 1 about here] Figure 1 shows strong, positive relationships among trust, perceptions of trustwarranting properties, and frequency of interaction. The relationships among trust, frequency of contact, and trust-warranting properties are most likely dynamic and reciprocal, and cannot be disentangled in a single cross-sectional study without strong instrumental variables. Frequency of contact and levels of trust are highest for actors that have pro-agricultural interests, which includes local service agencies and agricultural interest groups. The frequency of contact is lower for regulatory agencies, and also for agencies that are at higher levels of the federal system. Overall, the patterns in Figure 1 strongly support the transaction costs framework, but also bring up important measurement and causality issues that will be discussed later.
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The domain-specific view on trust suggests that even within the broad policy domain of agricultural water policy, not all trust-relationships are created equal. It is likely that the structure of trust varies according to the nature of the relationship between the farmers and the watershed organizations. The transaction cost approach would hypothesize that institutional distance created by the structure of federalism is a key contextual variable. The ACF would hypothesize that a key contextual variable would be the congruence between the policy interests of the farmers, and the policy interests of the organization. To explore this possibility, Tables 1   and 2 divide the organizations into four types by levels of the federal system: agricultural interests, agricultural service agencies, regulatory agencies, and coalition non-governmental groups. In a sense, these categorizations identify "sub-domains" of the policy domain, and thus there may be different dynamics in the three-part relationship between truster, trustee, and context in which trust is conferred.
[Tables 1 and 2 about here]
The policy interests dimension requires some elaboration. The rows of Tables 1 and 2 roughly divide organizations along a dimension from pro-to anti-agriculture, at least as Table 2 demonstrates the usefulness of the categorization scheme by displaying the average level of trust (linearly rescaled to 0-1 range) and frequency of no contact for each category. Agricultural interests and local service agencies have the highest levels of trust and contact, while federal regulatory agencies have the lowest levels. Coalition NGOs and service agencies at higher levels of the federal system are in the middle. The second column is particularly revealing, because it shows how trust and contact varies from high to low along the policy interest dimension for organizations at the same level of the federal system. I will maintain these broad distinctions in the multivariate models that follow in order to explore how the structure of policy trust varies for different types of relationships.
Heckman Selection Bias Models: Correcting for Unobserved Dyads
The next step is to test the hypotheses of each theoretical framework by statistically estimating the influence of trust-warranting properties, generalized trust, and social values on policy trust. Analysis of all farmer-organization dyads is not possible because respondents did not answer the trust questions for all organizations. Rather, respondents non-randomly selected certain organizations on which they would answer questions. I correct for potential selection bias due to item non-response with Heckman models, which simultaneously estimate a probit "selection" equation on the full sample to predict which dyads are observed, and a regression "outcome" equation for the subset which is observed (Heckman 1976; Greene 2000) . The error terms of the outcome and selection equations are assumed to be correlated at some value ρ ≠ 0.
Although the selection equation may have substantive meaning, it is mainly used to correct the parameter estimates in the outcome equation, which are the main theoretical focus.
The selection equations include a set of variables related to the likelihood that a farmer would be exposed to the network of organizations involved with agricultural water policy. The implicit assumption is that farmers are more likely to answer the trust questions if they have heard about the organization. The selection variables include the number of years farming, education (7-point scale), subjective size of farm relative to the average (1-5 Likert scale; 1= Much smaller than average, 5=Much larger), subjective wealth of farm (1-5 Likert scale; 1=Much worse off, 5=Much better off), and number of Coalition activities in which the farmer has participated (from a list of nine activities). ceteris paribus the expected value of policy trust when environmentalism = 1 (maximum value) will be .21 (.10 +.11=.21, or an absolute change of 11 percent points). Another way to interpret the coefficients for the attitude variables is as the maximum possible effect of the variable.
Results: Explaining Policy Trust
The basic strategy of the analysis is to estimate Heckman models for each of the four groups of farmer-organization dyads: agricultural interests, Coalition NGOs, service agencies, and regulatory agencies. 7 To test the transaction cost framework, I first estimated models using the single trust question as a dependent variable, with the trust-warranting properties as independent variables. On the basis of the strong causal assumption of no reciprocal relationships between trust and trust-warranting properties, the results mirror Figure 1 and support the transaction costs framework because nearly all the coefficients for beliefs about trustwarranting properties are significant, large and positive. None of the variables that operationalize the other theoretical frameworks are consistently significant. However, the assumption of no reciprocal relationships is probably not tenable in a cross-sectional analysis.
Panel design or experimental studies will be needed to untangle the dynamic relationships between the attitude of trust and beliefs about trust-warranting properties. Therefore I only report the results of these models in the Internet Appendix (Table A4) [ Table 3 about here]
An alternative approach is to think about trust from a measurement standpoint, and consider trust and trust-warranting properties all as measurements of the single underlying concept of policy trust. Indeed, equating the concept of trust with a variety of measurements about trust-warranting properties or other beliefs is by far the dominant measurement approach in the trust literature. For example, Brehm and Rahn (1997) construct a 3-item interpersonal trust scale that includes a question about trustworthiness, fairness, and helpfulness of other people (see citations in first paragraph for many other examples). To provide further hypothesis tests, Table 3 presents the outcome equations using a dependent variable that combines the trust and trust-warranting properties into a single 4-item scale (Cronbach's alpha= .95). Table 3 Of course, by trust, I don't know if I necessarily mean believing everything they say but I will have more confidence in their abilities. I have great confidence in the abilities of the Glenn County Ag Commissioner's office because I see what they do. They're out there proving every day their competence and they're free to admit if they don't know, or if something is beyond their expertise they'll admit that. But I don't have that day-to-day contact with the Regional Board, it's more a longer time period between the contact. And they haven't come out and said "We don't know." In my family, we're firm believers that if you don't know, say so. Don't try to b.s. your way through something, to try and cover up.
External political efficacy has a consistently positive influence on trust for all organization types.
The results suggest that generalized trust and political efficacy are important bases for more specific policy trust, but the basis shifts depending on the type of organization involved and the level of experience with specific individuals from that organization.
The results for the policy-core beliefs are consistent with the predictions of the ACF. The four-category classification scheme may possibly mask important differences between individual organizations. For example, the Coalition NGO category contains both the Northern California Water Association (NCWA, a non-profit interest group) and the Coalition for Urban-Rural Environmental Stewardship (CURES, a for-profit consulting firm). While NWCA receives a fair amount of contact and trust from farmers, CURES seems to be viewed more like an environmental group, with low levels of trust and contact. This may explain why the estimates for Coalition NGOs are more like regulatory agencies than for service agencies.
[ Figure 2 about here] Figure 2 provides a more detailed picture by reporting the slope coefficients for economic conservatism and environmentalism as estimated separately for each individual organization, using Heckman models and the exact same set of independent variables as in Table 3 . The horizontal axis on Figure 2 is organized left to right according to decreasing policy interest similarity, with the average value of policy interest similarity in the parentheses after each organization label. Figure 2 shows how the influence of policy-core beliefs on policy trust changes along the gradient of policy interest similarity.
For regulatory organizations like the Water Boards, environmentalism has a strong positive effect, and economic conservatism has a strong negative effect. The magnitude of this divide moves towards zero as policy interests become more similar for neutral organizations, and then reverses direction for the pro-agricultural service agencies and agricultural interests. For example, environmentalism has a strong negative effect and economic conservatism a strong positive effect on trust in the County Farm Bureau. There is also a slight asymmetry, with policy-core beliefs having a greater effect for those organizations that are most contrary to the interests of farmers. Policy-core beliefs do not have as strong an influence on the more neutral, bridging organizations like NCWA and UC Cooperative Extension. However, CURES and Ducks Unlimited are apparently viewed more like regulatory agencies, which means that not all of the Coalition NGOs are effectively mediating between competing interests.
The more detailed picture provides strong evidence for the predictions of the ACF-the influence of policy-core beliefs as a basis for trust is conditional on the similarity of interests between the truster and trustee. The development of policy trust can only be understood in the context of competing political values and the ideological differences between truster and trustee.
Conclusions
The analyses presented above provide support for integrating the three theoretical frameworks considered in this paper. As predicted by the transaction cost framework, there is a very strong link between policy trust, beliefs about trust-warranting properties, and the frequency of interaction. In fact, the link is so strong it makes more sense in a cross-sectional analysis to consider trust and trust-warranting properties as measurements of a single underlying concept.
More research on the dynamic properties of trust will be needed to uncover which trustwarranting property is most important under what conditions, how trust influences perceptions of trust-warranting properties, and the functional forms of any updating or learning processes.
Generalized trust is also an important basis for the development of more specific policy trust. The analysis provides circumstantial empirical evidence that generalized trust in government has a stronger influence on trust in government agencies with which farmers have less frequent contact and "thinner" relationships. Generalized trust in people has a stronger influence for agricultural interests and service agencies, which tend to feature thicker relationships and more person-to-person contact. Generalized trust provides a baseline set of expectations, which are adjusted in light of more information about a specific organization.
Political efficacy is a positive influence on policy trust for all types of relationships. cooperation, one hypothesis is that the influence of policy-core beliefs on policy trust will be less during periods of cooperation and stronger during periods of conflict.
Overall, the analysis provides some important findings about the structure of policy trust in the specific domain of agricultural water policy. The findings also provide some intriguing clues about the dynamics of trust in citizen-government relationships in general. In particular, different types of citizen-government relationships appear to be characterized by two key contextual variables that influence how trust operates in a specific domain: ideological and institutional distance.
Ideological distance is important because all policy and political domains feature a gradient of interests on which political actors and citizens can be arranged (e.g., Figure 2 ).
Citizens will have higher levels of trust in those actors who are closer in ideological distance.
Furthermore, the influence of policy-core beliefs shifts along the gradient of interests, having a very strong influence for ideologically distant and ideologically similar organizations, with less influence on more neutral organizations. Thus the information processing role of policy-core beliefs will tend to reinforce political divisions, and is probably a fundamental feature of public policy. This hypothesis may also prove relevant to trust in a domain extensively studied by political scientists: national American electoral politics, which is often organized by the typical liberal-conservative dimension.
Institutional distance is important because it influences the "thickness" of the trust relationship. Citizens are less likely to have direct experience and interaction with institutionally distant federal and state agencies. Thus, they will not have much information about the trustwarranting properties of these actors and trust will depend more on stereotypes and generalized trust in government. Social trust and specific information about trust-warranting properties will have a stronger influence as institutional distance decreases.
These hypotheses require further testing in other specific policy and political domains, with an eye towards panel studies that untangle dynamic, reciprocal relationships. The study of trust may also benefit from explicit application of spatial theories of politics. However, care must be taken to avoid sacrificing a general understanding of how trust operates in society, especially if the bases and consequences of trust turn out to be very different in each domain.
That certainly does not mean domain-specific research is not valuable. However, to preserve the ability to make more general statements, multi-level theory will be needed to understand the dimensions on which domains vary, and then making predictions about the dynamics of trust based on domain characteristics.
1 The ACF also posits a third level of beliefs called deep core beliefs, which are fundamental views on human nature and influence both policy-core and secondary beliefs. Since I do not directly measure those beliefs in this paper, I
do not discuss the influence of deep core beliefs on trust.
2 Part of the reason the sample farms look richer is that the Census collects information on sales, while I collected information on gross farm revenue, which includes sales plus additional income from rental payments and subsidies.
3 The years farming, work week, and education statistics are not strictly comparable to figures from the Agricultural Census, but these figures do not suggest any type of large or systematic bias. Better-educated farmers tend to have higher incomes (Pearson's r=.10) and be younger (Pearson's r=-.09). These patterns are typical of a demographic transition in agriculture to younger, better-educated farmers replacing the older, less educated farmers. The education numbers in particular should help dispel the myth of farmers being a poorly educated community. For example, the 2000 Population Census reports 26% of Californians have a bachelor's degree or higher, while 46% of the farmer respondents report a bachelor's degree or higher. 4 One interesting idiosyncrasy in Figure 1 is Ducks Unlimited, which has a high level of trust relative to contact frequency. There is a substantive explanation for this in the Coalition context, where Ducks Unlimited mainly represents farmers who manage wetlands for waterfowl hunting. While wetland managers are rare relative to agricultural production farms, they share many of the same values as production farmers, and sometimes even combine wetlands management with production agriculture.
5 Subjective perceptions of farm size and wealth are used because farmers do not like to provide specific information about income and farm size. They consider it private, and thus there is a high proportion of non-response on those variables. Furthermore, perceptions of size and wealth may drive decisions just as much as the objective farm characteristics.
6 One potential objection to this model specification is that the all the variables included in the selection equationnot just subjective farm size and wealth-should be included as controls in the outcome equation, because previous studies have found education, income, and age to be positively related to trust. In preliminary regression analyses, I
found that these variables were almost never significantly related to trust, and therefore chose to exclude them from the outcome equation to help stabilize the numerical properties of the estimator. See Sartori (2003) for discussion about the stability of Heckman estimators under different assumptions. 7 To evaluate the robustness of these results, I also estimated OLS regression models and ordered probit models on the observed dyads. The direction and statistical significance of the results are no different for the regression or ordered probit models (contact author for results). Overall, these results are remarkably robust to different model specifications. 
